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“A storm is coming and I know what I’ll be doing when it claims my first 
patient.  What will you be doing?  What will you have done?  We have told 
you who is at risk.  Please let as many out as you possibly can. end.”1 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, long before the sweeping impact of COVID-19, the 
criminal legal system in New York City has been on a halting path toward 
decarceration.  Set against the national backdrop of declining crime rates and 
a reckoning with the economic, social, and racial costs of mass 
criminalization and incarceration, elected officials in New York City and 
State have acknowledged that a shift toward reducing the number of people 
held in New York City jails is long overdue.2  Particular attention has been 
focused on Rikers Island, the notoriously violent, sprawling jail complex, 
which has been regarded as one of the most visibly troubling aspects of the 
administration of criminal “justice” in New York City.  With its reputation 
for corruption, violence, and human rights abuses, Rikers has become the 
final resting place for New York City’s failed social welfare and criminal 
legal systems.3  Former New York State Court of Appeals Chief Justice 
Jonathan Lippman has called Rikers Island “a stain on the soul of New York 
City.”4 
 
 2. In an official statement touting his change of policy on closing Rikers Island, Mayor 
Bill de Blasio proclaimed: 
Mass incarceration did not begin in New York City, but it will end here . . . . With 
the lowest rate of incarceration of any major city, we are proving you don’t need to 
arrest your way to safety. New York is a telling a different story, one where we can 
keep fathers at home and kids in schools and still be the safest big city in America. 
Press Release, City of N.Y., Projected City Jail Population Falls to 3,300 by 2026 (Oct. 15, 
2019) [hereinafter Projected City Jail Population], 
https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/484-19/projected-city-jail-population-falls-
3-300-2026 [https://perma.cc/4S7C-RY2U]. 
 3. See Michael Jacobson et al., Beyond the Island: Changing the Culture of New York 
City Jails, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 373, 376 (2018). See generally This Is Rikers, MARSHALL 
PROJECT (June 28, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/06/28/this-is-rikers 
[https://perma.cc/L3A5-4L4P]. 
 4. Closing Rikers Island: A Catalyst for Criminal Justice Reform, CITY LAND (Apr. 16, 
2019), 
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As the primary jail complex for New York City, Rikers Island currently 
has eight facilities that house people who are held in pretrial detention, 
sentenced to less than one year in jail, or accused of violating the conditions 
of their New York State parole.5  New York City’s jail system has 
historically been among the largest in the world and manages a significant 
number of detainees, predominately Black and Latinx, who deal with 
homelessness as well as substance and mental health concerns.6  At its peak 
in 1991, City jails held over 21,000 people.7  In the past two decades as crime 
has fallen, the population of people held in detention in New York City jails 
has also dropped.8 
Within recent years, criminal legal reform organizers and advocates have 
seized the downward trends in crime and broader rejection of mass 
incarceration policies to galvanize the support of backers in New York City 
and State government and push for the closure of Rikers Island.9  In October 
2019, the New York City Council voted in favor of a plan to close Rikers 
Island by 2026 and replace it with four smaller borough-based jails, 
drastically reducing the space available for incarceration in New York City.10  
This vote came over the objection of more abolitionist-oriented advocates, 
who want to see Rikers Island closed, but oppose investing public funds in 




 5. There are also two other jails runs by New York City Department of Correction in 
Manhattan and Brooklyn. See Facilities Overview, N.Y.C. DEP’T CORRECTION, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doc/about/facilities.page [https://perma.cc/6W8T-H98H] (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2020). 
 6. See Ross MacDonald et al., The Rikers Island Hot Spotters: Defining the Needs of the 
Most Frequently Incarcerated, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2262, 2262 (2015). 
 7. See Judith A. Greene & Vincent Schiraldi, Better by Half: The New York City Story 
of Winning Large-Scale Decarceration While Improving Public Safety, 29 FED. SENT’G REP. 
22, 22 (2016). 
 8. See id. 
 9. See id. at 36. (“New York’s unprecedented reduction in reliance on incarceration has 
been a bottom-up, advocacy-driven, community-focused strategy, as opposed to their 
topdown, technocratic, elite-consensus approach. In New York, public officials and policy 
makers have been relentlessly pressured by vigorous demands from advocates, organizers, 
and activists, who have also worked tirelessly to educate the public about the need for a more 
humane and effective criminal justice system.”). 
 10. See Matthew Haag, N.Y.C. Votes to Close Rikers. Now Comes the Hard Part, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 17, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/17/nyregion/rikers-island-closing-vote.html 
[https://perma.cc/6UMD-SHWB]. 
 11. Advocates with an abolitionist vision did not support the plan to spend billions in 
public funds to replace Rikers Island with newly constructed, smaller borough-based jails. 
See Gabriel Sayegh, Making Sense of the Fight over NYC Jails, KATAL CTR. FOR EQUITY 
HEALTH & JUST. (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.katalcenter.org/makingsenserikers 
[https://perma.cc/GM9B-P7EU]. 
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by those in city government as New York City’s “historic decarceration” 
plan.12  Yet, for the City’s closure plan to be possible, the Mayor estimated 
that it would take a period of years well beyond his tenure to drastically 
reduce the jail population to fewer than 6,000 people.13 
Even before the City Council’s vote, stakeholders were beginning to 
closely examine what reforms would be necessary at earlier stages of the 
criminal legal process to shrink New York City’s jail population.14  They 
explored administrative changes such as increased use of diversion, 
supervised release, and policy modifications within the New York Police 
Department (NYPD) and local district attorneys’ offices.15  In April 2019, in 
a major legislative boost to the efforts to close Rikers, New York State 
passed wide-reaching criminal justice reform legislation that eliminated 
money bail and pretrial detention for virtually all misdemeanor and 
non-violent felony offenses, provided for early disclosure of prosecutorial 
evidence, and strengthened speedy trial rights.16  These changes, while not a 
panacea for the ills of the criminal legal system, did represent a significant 
step forward in efforts to shift the City’s overreliance on incarceration and 
excessively punitive approaches. 
In January 2020, just before the COVID-19 outbreak, the population of 
New York City jails was as at a low of 5,721,17 and New York State’s 
legislative changes had just gone into effect.18  With the emergence of 
COVID-19 in New York City in March, advocates and public defenders 
began to publicly warn about the impending public health crisis of 
COVID-19 and the need for the rapid reduction of the census on Rikers 
 
 12. See Projected City Jail Population, supra note 2. 




 14. See generally INDEP. COMM’N ON N.Y.C. CRIM. JUST. & INCARCERATION REFORM, A 




 15. See id. 
 16. See Making Sense of Bail Reform in NYS, Part 2, KATAL CTR. FOR EQUITY HEALTH & 
JUST. (May 17, 2019), https://www.katalcenter.org/bailreform_nys2 
[https://perma.cc/Q8MJ-WT67]. 
 17. N.Y.C. MAYOR’S OFF. OF CRIM. JUST., NEW YORK CITY JAIL POPULATION REDUCTION 
IN THE TIME OF COVID-19 (2020) [hereinafter MOCJ FACTSHEET May 25, 2020], 
https://criminaljustice.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/COVID-factsheet-MA
Y-25-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/367N-RU7Z]. 
 18. See Making Sense of Bail Reform in NYS, Part 2, supra note 16. 
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Island and in other City jail facilities.19  Public health officials, the Board of 
Correction, and other oversight groups recommended actions to minimize 
the impact of COVID-19, such as decreasing the jail population and 
admissions, as well as drastically reducing face-to-face contact in precincts, 
courts, and sites of community supervision.20  Notably, these actions fit 
within the rationale of effective strategies for decarceration more generally.21 
This Article examines how the City’s broader decarceration agenda can 
be informed by the lessons learned from efforts to rapidly depopulate Rikers 
Island during the height of the COVID-19 outbreak.  It argues that long term 
decarceration in New York City will not be realized without meaningful 
investments in necessary social supports and a willingness to shift away from 
outmoded conceptions of public safety.  The economic instability brought 
about by COVID-19 undoubtedly make these financial and ideological 
changes all the more necessary and complex.  Part I provides a brief 
overview of the pre-COVID-19 approach to decarceration in New York City.  
Part II details how various institutional actors responded to the need to 
accelerate the release of people detained at Rikers Island during the height 
of the pandemic.  It highlights the often-regressive character of 
decision-making by police, prosecutors, courts, and government agencies 
during the pandemic.  Part III argues that critical insights gained during the 
systemic response to the initial COVID-19 outbreak should inform ongoing 
decarceration efforts in New York City.  It contends that the City’s 
COVID-19 response shows that many institutional actors across the City are 
only willing to do the bare minimum in achieving decarceration, even when 
the lives of detained people and City employees are at stake.  This Article 
proposes movement away from deeply entrenched, punitive practices and 
policies and more expansive investment in non-carceral services and 
institutions for a meaningful, long-term decarceral agenda. 
 
 19. See Jan Ransom & Alan Feuer, ‘A Storm Is Coming’: Fears of an Inmate Epidemic 
as the Virus Spreads in the Jails, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/20/nyregion/nyc-coronavirus-rikers-island.html 
[https://perma.cc/X35M-N43L]. 
 20. See id. See generally Jonathan Lippman & Tyler Nims, Let More People out of Rikers: 
The Coronavirus Demands Bolder Action to Decarcerate, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 18, 2020), 
https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-let-more-people-out-of-rikers-20200418-caf
itdk7sjamljylgskfts73se-story.html [https://perma.cc/A383-4V84]; Peter Wagner & Emily 
Widra, Five Ways the Criminal Justice System Could Slow the Pandemic, PRISON POL’Y 
INITIATIVE (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/03/27/slowpandemic/. 
[https://perma.cc/NV72-LS9U]. 
 21. See DENNIS SCHRANTZ, STEPHEN DEBOR & MARC MAUER, SENT’G PROJECT, 
DECARCERATION STRATEGIES: HOW 5 STATES ACHIEVED SUBSTANTIAL PRISON POPULATION 
REDUCTIONS 6–7 (2018), 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/decarceration-strategies-5-states-achieved-s
ubstantial-prison-population-reductions/ [https://perma.cc/SM6G-B6GH]. 
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I. DECARCERATION BEFORE COVID-19 
The movement toward decarceral policies in New York City is largely the 
result of efforts to close Rikers Island.  Over the past several decades, Rikers 
Island has served as an inhumane warehouse for people at the margins of life 
in New York City due to poverty, structural racism, and mental and 
substance abuse issues.22  The majority of people held at Rikers are pretrial 
detainees, people who are presumed innocent but remain behind bars 
because they have been denied bail or because they do not have the financial 
resources to pay the bail amount set.23  Rikers Island, with its 
well-documented reputation for violence, racial inequities, and punitiveness, 
represents many of the larger criminal legal system’s ills.24 
While local officials have been aware of the problems at Rikers Island for 
quite some time, a reduction in arrest and crime rates and concerns about the 
impact of mass incarceration made it politically feasible to explore the 
political and legal strategies necessary to close Rikers and shrink the overall 
jail capacity in New York City.25  This Part gives a brief overview of recent 
decarceration efforts in New York City.  It highlights the history of violence 
and abuse at Rikers and outlines the various pre-COVID-19 measures taken 
to reduce the detained population and move toward diminished reliance on 
jails. 
A. The Case for Closing Rikers Island 
In October 2019, the New York City Council approved a plan to close 
Rikers Island and replace it with a number of smaller borough-based jails by 
2026.26  The vote marked a significant milestone after years of grassroots 
advocacy and political maneuvering and promised, at least in word, to put 
New York City “at the forefront of a national movement to reverse decades 
of mass incarceration that disproportionately affected black and Hispanic 
people.”27  The vote was indeed historic.  For over eight decades, Rikers 
Island has served as the primary criminal detention facility for New York 
 
 22. See generally A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY, supra note 14. 
 23. See Janos Marton, #CLOSErikers: The Campaign to Transform New York City’s 
Criminal Justice System, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 499, 526 (2018). 
 24. See Darren Walker, Lessons from Rikers Island, ATLANTIC (May 9, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/rikers-island/525858/ 
[https://perma.cc/2TPN-SDEE]. 
 25. See Jarrett Murphy, It Will Take Tenacity and Guts to Shutter One of the Country’s 
Most Notorious Jails, NATION (July 25, 2017), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/it-will-take-tenacity-and-guts-to-shutter-one-of-th
e-countrys-most-notorious-jails/ [https://perma.cc/MR2X-GXYX]. 
 26. See Haag, supra note 10. 
 27. Id. 
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City.28  As the number of facilities and people held on Rikers Island grew 
over the years, so did its reputation for violence, corruption, and 
mismanagement.29  Despite many efforts to reform and even close down 
Rikers in the past, the political, fiscal, and social conditions never quite 
converged until this moment.30 
Rikers Island was built to replace its predecessor, Blackwell’s Island 
penitentiary, which was marked by overcrowding and corruption.31  Before 
its opening in 1935, Rikers Island was touted as a space that would allow 
detainees to reenter society with better “mental and moral health” and with 
valuable vocational training.32  However, mismanagement and 
overcrowding marked Rikers Island from the beginning.33  Yet it was not 
until the 1960s and 1970s that the foundation for modern-day problems with 
the facility developed.34  During this time frame, the social, economic, and 
racial upheaval happening in New York City contributed to the steady 
population increases and racial disparities that have become hallmarks of the 
institution.35  The demographic composition of Rikers Island “evolved from 
a jail population that was 85% white in 1930 to 35% white by 1970 to 92.5% 
people of color in 2015.”36  The New York City fiscal crisis of the mid-1970s 
also took funds away from City jails, depriving the facility of resources and 
deepening substandard conditions of confinement.37 
The first major government-driven attempt to close Rikers Island occurred 
during Ed Koch’s mayoral administration.38  After a number of litigation 
efforts against the City and failed reform attempts, Koch appointed Herb 
Sturz, known for his work on bail reform and as a founding director of the 
Manhattan Project (later known as the Vera Institute), as deputy mayor for 
criminal justice.39  Sturz evaluated the severely deficient conditions at Rikers 
 
 28. See Marton, supra note 23, at 500. 
 29. See id. at 503–04. 
 30. See id. at 516–18. 
 31. See id. at 507. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See This Is Rikers, supra note 3. 
 34. See Jacobson et al., supra note 3, at 384–86. 
 35. See Marton, supra note 23, at 508–10. 
 36. Id. at 509. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See id. at 508–10. 
 39. See JB Nicholas, A History Of Hell: How Rikers Island Became a Modern Municipal 
Abomination, VILL. VOICE (Apr. 11, 2017), 
https://www.villagevoice.com/2017/04/11/a-history-of-hell-how-rikers-island-became-a-mo
dern-municipal-abomination/ [https://perma.cc/MM5W-EPWB] (“In 1975, prisoners held in 
New York City’s jails filed seven separate class-action lawsuits in federal court that 
challenged thirty discrete areas of prison administration and, collectively, alleged that the 
conditions they were confined under were inhumane and unlawful under the Constitution. But 
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and its remote and inaccessible location and recommended that the City sell 
the property to the state and use the proceeds to create smaller jail facilities 
within reach of criminal courts in each borough.40  Sturz’s proposals were 
never adopted, in part because of the rising crime rate and the rapid 
expansion of the jail population.41 
The 1990s marked the notable emergence of hyper-aggressive policing 
strategies, gang influence, and significant overcrowding at Rikers Island, 
with the daily population reaching close to 22,000.42  The number of 
corrections officers working within Rikers facilities also increased, bringing 
along more powerful gear such as “pepper spray, mace, and electrified stun 
shields.”43  All of these conditions helped encourage a culture of brutal 
violence.44  By the 2000s, as the City’s crime rate began to fall, the number 
of homicides dropped from 2,245 in 1990 to 334 in 2016.45  Yet, even as the 
number of people held at Rikers gradually decreased, the culture of violence 
and brutality persisted.46 
A few particularly significant, high-profile examples of the problems at 
Rikers Island helped to bring the ills of New York City’s infamous jail 
complex into popular consciousness.  In October 2008, while being held in 
an adolescent facility on Rikers Island, 18-year-old Christopher Robinson 
was viciously beaten and killed by other detained teens.47  The Department 
of Correction Intelligence Unit and the Bronx District Attorney’s Office 
launched investigations into Christopher Robinson’s killing, which 
confirmed the existence of an enterprise known as “the Program,” an 
elaborate scheme in which corrections officers “either look the other way, or 
 
the administration of Mayor Abraham Beame was consumed by the city’s existential financial 
crisis, and it paid little attention to the lawsuits.”). 
 40. See Marton, supra note 23, at 511. 
 41. Martin Horn, who served as DOC Commissioner from 2002–2010, was also 
convinced that City jails needed to be decentralized. However, community opposition to 
building new facilities in the Bronx thwarted his plans. See id. at 516–17. 
 42. See id. at 513. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. at 513–14. 
 45. See A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY, supra note 14, at 22. 
 46. See Marton, supra note 23, at 519. The problem of violence at Rikers Island has 
continued up until recently. According to a federal monitor’s report, from 2016 to 2019, use 
of force by guards at Rikers Island increased by 54% despite a falling jail population. See 
Benjamin Weiser, Violence at Rikers at an ‘All-Time High’ Despite City’s Promise to Curb 
It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/06/nyregion/rikers-island-violence-guards.html 
[perma.cc/VB6L-47XA]. 
 47. See Russ Buettner, Rikers Extortions Noted Before Death, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/16/nyregion/16rikers.html 
[https://perma.cc/D2PS-2BXQ]; Geoffrey Gray, The Lords of Rikers, N.Y. MAG. (Jan. 28, 
2011), https://nymag.com/news/features/70978 [https://perma.cc/9G83-648M]. 
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actively enable, tougher inmates to beat up on weaker ones in order to control 
them and extort their privileges.”48  The Bronx District Attorney charged at 
least three corrections officers and a number of incarcerated young people 
with recruiting and serving as “managers, foot soldiers and enforcers” within 
the jail facilities and “deciding where and when attacks would occur.”49  The 
extensive scale of “the Program” provided a window into a deep-seated and 
extreme culture of violence and corruption at Rikers Island.50 
In August 2014, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern 
District of New York, then led by Preet Bharara, issued a 79-page report 
describing in detail the complicity and “powerful code of silence” that 
allowed for brutal violence to continue unabated at the hands of staff and 
detainees on Rikers Island.51  The report detailed officer-created 
punishments that included assaults to the head, beatings, and removals of 
detainees to isolated areas outside of video view.52  The report also 
documented officers’ extended and excessive use of solitary confinement 
against detainees.53 
In September 2014, The New Yorker first reported the tragic case of Kalief 
Browder.54  Mr. Browder was 16-years-old when he was arrested for stealing 
 
 48. Sadhbh Walshe, Is Rikers Island Jail with ‘The Program’?, GUARDIAN (May 16, 
2012), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/may/16/is-rikers-island-jail-w
ith-the-program [https://perma.cc/8XMB-8R55]; see also Gray, supra note 47. 
 49. Benjamin Weiser, Lawsuits Suggest Pattern of Rikers Guards Looking Other Way, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/04/nyregion/04rikers.html 
[https://perma.cc/4G6A-DVSE]. 
 50. See Gray, supra note 47. 
 51. See Benjamin Weiser & Michael Schwirtz, U.S. Finds a ‘Culture of Violence’ Against 
Teenage Inmates at Rikers Island, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/05/nyregion/us-attorneys-office-reveals-civil-rights-inve
stigation-at-rikers-island.html [https://perma.cc/ZXA5-4JTX]. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See id. It is well documented that people subjected to solitary confinement experience 
extreme psychological and physical harm. Many psychologists and human rights 
organizations regard solitary confinement as a form of torture. See Juan E. Méndez (Special 
Rapporteur), Hum. Rts. Council on Torture & Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. 
A/66/268 (Aug. 5. 2011), 
http://www.solitaryconfinement.org/uploads/SpecRapTortureAug2011.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/22QT-8TXG]; Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 
22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 325, 327 (2006) (detailing the extreme psychiatric harm of solitary 
confinement); Atul Gawande, Hellhole, NEW YORKER (Mar. 23, 2009), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/03/30/hellhole#ixzz0gGPlkqY7 
[https://perma.cc/TU2M-GYUA]. 
 54. See Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, NEW YORKER (Sept. 29, 2014), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law 
[https://perma.cc/9DZJ-JWJT]. 
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a backpack and held at Rikers, in both solitary confinement and general 
population, for more than three years before the charges against him were 
finally dismissed.55  The article was particularly compelling because it 
highlighted for the general public not only the inhumane abuses of Rikers, 
but also the way the entire legal process — from bail to discovery to speedy 
trial — and all the court actors — from prosecutor to defense attorney to 
judge — were responsible for Mr. Browder’s tragic circumstances.56  Mr. 
Browder’s subsequent death by suicide after his release from jail deepened 
the heartbreaking nature of his story and has been used by many as a call to 
action to close Rikers and bring about meaningful policy and legislative 
reform.57 
B. New York City’s Road to Decarceration 
New York City would have been unlikely to adopt a movement toward 
decarceration and the closure of Rikers Island without the mobilization 
efforts of grassroots activists, advocates, and community members.  
Organizing groups intensified the pressure on local and state politicians, 
which in turn brought about new policy directives and legislative reforms 
aimed at shrinking the population at Rikers.  This Section highlights how 
organizing, policy, and legislation have provided the foundation for 
decarceration efforts in New York City before the emergence of COVID-19. 
i. Community Organizing 
The atrocities of Rikers Island that gained widespread media attention 
were already fueling an agenda for grassroots change in New York City.  
Conditions at Rikers Island, as well as the NYPD’s aggressive use of stop 
and frisk and culture of violence as demonstrated in the chokehold killing of 
Eric Garner, served as flash points for organized protests and uprisings 
across the City.58  Thus, it should come as no surprise that grassroots 
organizing played a vitally important role in advancing decarceral policies 
 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. 
 57. See Michael Schwirtz & Michael Winerip, Kalief Browder, Held at Rikers Island for 
3 Years Without Trial, Commits Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/09/nyregion/kalief-browder-held-at-rikers-island-for-3-y
ears-without-trial-commits-suicide.html [https://perma.cc/2Z7G-YFRS]. 
 58. See John Leland & Colin Moynihan, Thousands March Silently to Protest 
Stop-and-Frisk Policies, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/18/nyregion/thousands-march-silently-to-protest-stop-an
d-frisk-policies.html [https://perma.cc/G72E-PFDJ]; Megan Specia & Colin Dalieda, How 
Twitter and Facebook Helped Shut Down Lower Manhattan for Eric Garner, MASHABLE 
(Dec. 5, 2014), https://mashable.com/2014/12/05/protests-eric-garner-grassroots/ 
[https://perma.cc/M94E-LFYF]. 
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across New York City’s criminal legal system and in advocating for the 
closure of Rikers Island.59 
Groups such as the Campaign to Shut Down Rikers, Millions March 
NYC, and Jails Action Coalition used the mobilization power of incarcerated 
and formerly incarcerated people and their allies to push not only for the 
closure of  Rikers Island but, importantly, the City’s broader divestment from 
carceral structures such as policing and prisons.60  These alliances insisted 
that Rikers Island be closed and that government funds be used for necessary 
services that would help keep people out of the system, such as education, 
healthcare, and housing.61  One coalition, No New Jails, which advocates for 
the closure of Rikers and prison abolition through opposing the construction 
of new jails, has drawn public attention to the amount of money the City 
currently spends on carceral systems instead of communities.62  In particular, 
they highlight the $8.7 billion needed for building new jails and the 
continued increase in the Department of Correction budget despite the 
decline in incarceration.63  They point out that in Fiscal Year 2018, the 
average annual cost to incarcerate a person in New York City jails surpassed 
$300,000, which is money that could be spent on affordable housing, 
 
 59. There are a number of campaigns across the City and State working for decarceration 
of jails and prisons. See, e.g., FREE THEM ALL FOR PUB. HEALTH, 
https://freethemall4publichealth.org/ [https://perma.cc/3523-C6RH] (last visited Oct. 14, 
2020); RELEASE AGING PEOPLE PRISON, http://rappcampaign.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/XPW9-UTLK] (last visited Oct. 14, 2020). For information on the campaign 
to close Rikers Island, see #CLOSErikers, JUSTLEADERSHIPUSA, 
http://jlusa.org/campaign/closerikers/#:~:text=In%20April%202016%2C%20JustLeadership
USA%20launched,policy%20of%20New%20York%20City 
[https://perma.cc/5D6M-AVG4] (last visited Oct. 14, 2020). 
 60. See Raven Rakia & Ashoka Jegroo, How the Push to Close Rikers Went from No Jails 
to New Jails, APPEAL (May 29, 2018), 
https://theappeal.org/how-the-push-to-close-rikers-went-from-no-jails-to-new-jails/ 
[https://perma.cc/M5ZJ-JQGS]. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See Press Release, N.Y.C. Comptroller Scott M. Stringer, Comptroller Stringer: 
Despite a Decline in Incarceration, Correction Spending, Violence, and Use of Force 
Continued to Rise in FY 2018 (Jan. 22, 2019) [hereinafter Despite a Decline in Incarceration], 
https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/comptroller-stringer-despite-a-decline-in-incarceratio
n-correction-spending-violence-and-use-of-force-continued-to-rise-in-fy-2018/ 
[https://perma.cc/V7MQ-DRXJ]; NO NEW JAILS NYC, CLOSE RIKERS NOW, WE KEEP US 
SAFE: A NEW YORKER’S GUIDE TO BUILDING COMMUNITY CARE AND SAFETY BY CLOSING 
RIKERS WITH NO NEW JAILS (VERSION 2.0) (2019), 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1NPW9cNv6AsbKYF_se4d8lIHQ5cyHOvOx/view 
[https://perma.cc/8L9H-RX7B]; Emily Nonko, What Would ‘No New Jails’ Actually Look 
Like?, GOTHAMIST (July 16, 2019, 3:05 PM), 
https://gothamist.com/news/what-would-no-new-jails-actually-look-like 
[https://perma.cc/QW2H-LUDM]. 
 63. See Nonko, supra note 62; Despite a Decline in Incarceration, supra note 62. 
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improving mental healthcare and schools, or in investments in 
community-based programs like violence interruption.64 
Another organizing group that played a critical role in the effort to close 
Rikers Island was the #CLOSErikers campaign led by JustLeadershipUSA.65  
The #CLOSErikers campaign was composed of directly impacted 
individuals and over 100 non-profits and partner organizations across the 
City.66  The group used three strategic approaches in its advocacy by (1) 
seeking to influence the public narrative about Rikers Island and its detainees 
through public actions and digital outreach, (2) putting pressure on elected 
officials who would support a closure plan, and (3) aligning the coalition 
with decarceral policy changes that would lead to the closure of Rikers.67  
Specifically, #CLOSErikers advocated for decarceral policies such as 
modifying pretrial detention, “eliminating city sentences of one year or less 
and replacing them with alternatives like community service; revamping the 
parole supervision system; and decriminalizing low-level, non-violent 
crimes like turnstile jumping.”68 
One important difference between grassroots groups pushing for the 
closure of Rikers, like Shut Down Rikers and No New Jails, and the 
#CLOSErikers campaign centered on the issue of constructing new 
borough-based jails.  The leadership of the #CLOSErikers campaign 
ultimately took a position that supporting the closure of Rikers Island and 
the construction of smaller borough-based jails is a tangible step toward 
decreasing the current levels of incarceration in the City.69  However, even 
Rikers was designed to be a better, more modern jail when it was built.  
Therefore many abolitionist organizers are convinced that building new jails 
will allow government actors to continue to focus on incarceration rather 
than social investment.70  They are instead eager to see attention paid to the 
underlying social and institutional dysfunction that has allowed incarceration 
to proliferate. 
ii. The Lippman Commission Report and the Mayor’s Smaller Safer Fairer 
Roadmap 
In February 2016, New York City Council Speaker Melissa 
Mark-Viverito spearheaded a privately funded independent commission to 
 
 64. See Nonko, supra note 62; Despite a Decline in Incarceration, supra note 62. 
 65. See Rakia & Jegroo, supra note 60. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See Marton, supra note 23, at 535. 
 68. Nonko, supra note 62. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See Rakia & Jegroo, supra note 60. 
2020] DECARCERATING NEW YORK CITY 69 
study the criminal legal system and Rikers Island and to make 
recommendations on fundamental reforms.71  Former New York State Chief 
Judge Jonathan Lippman chaired the commission and worked with leaders 
from across the private and public sectors to examine the issues connected 
to Rikers Island and author a comprehensive report.  In 2017, The 
Independent Commission on New York City Criminal Justice and 
Incarceration Reform issued what has come to be known as the Lippman 
Commission Report, which provided a powerful rebuke of the jail facility: 
“Closing Rikers Island is a moral imperative.  The Island is a powerful 
symbol of a discredited approach to criminal justice — a penal colony that 
subjects all within its walls to inhumane conditions.”72  The report 
highlighted the policies that needed to be implemented in order to reduce the 
City’s reliance on detention and asserted that the jail population, which 
hovered around 9,700 at that point, would need to be reduced to 5,000 for 
Rikers Island to close and be replaced with smaller borough-based jails.73  It 
also explored measures to transform pretrial detention into a rehabilitative 
rather than punitive process and contemplated other uses for the space that 
the Rikers facilities currently occupy, emphasizing housing and employment 
reinvestment for the communities most impacted by mass incarceration.74 
Following the release of the Lippman Commission Report, and trying to 
seize on the political moment, Mayor de Blasio’s office released Smaller 
Safer Fairer: A Roadmap to Closing Rikers,75 which presented reforms that, 
in large part, overlapped with the Lippman Commission Report’s 
recommendations.76  After previously characterizing efforts to close Rikers 
as “a noble concept” that was unpractical,77 Mayor de Blasio joined the calls 
 
 71. See J. David Goodman, Melissa Mark-Viverito, Council Speaker, Vows to Pursue 
Criminal Justice Reforms, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/nyregion/melissa-mark-viverito-council-speaker-vow
s-to-pursue-new-criminal-justice-reforms.html [https://perma.cc/3GXE-ZK4L]. 
 72. A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY, supra note 14, at 19. 
 73. See id. at 71–75, 88 (noting the utility of borough-based jails and discussing the 
necessity of a jail population reduction to 5,000). 
 74. See id. at 61–62, 105 (discussing sentencing reforms that favor rehabilitation and 
referencing employment and housing opportunities that come from closing Rikers Island). 
 75. See Mayor de Blasio Announces “Smaller, Safer, Fairer: A Roadmap to Closing 
Rikers Island,” OFF. MAYOR, CITY N.Y. (June 22, 2017), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/427-17/mayor-de-blasio-smaller-safer-faire
r—roadmap-closing-rikers-island- [https://perma.cc/ZZ43-HR9A]. See generally OFF. OF THE 
MAYOR, CITY OF N.Y., SMALLER SAFER FAIRER: A ROADMAP TO CLOSING RIKERS ISLAND 
(2017) [hereinafter SMALLER SAFER FAIRER], 
https://rikers.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/Smaller-Safer-Fairer-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q95S-G24L]. 
 76. See id. at 26. 
 77. See J. David Goodman, De Blasio Says Idea of Closing Rikers Jail Complex Is 
Unrealistic, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2016), 
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for Rikers Island’s closure and announced the appointment of a Task Force 
charged with implementing the recommendations outlined in his office’s 
Smaller Safer Fairer roadmap.78  The roadmap identifies changes in the 
City’s criminal legal process to reduce the City’s jail population, such as 
facilitating the payment of bail, supplanting short-term jail sentences with 
programs, utilizing supervised release, processing cases through the courts 
more quickly, and reducing the reliance on jails for cases involving mental 
health or substance abuse concerns.79  The roadmap details a vision of jails 
that are “safe and humane,” with an emphasis on greater mental health 
treatment, rehabilitative programming, and less use of punitive 
segregation.80  The Mayor’s plan proposes a significantly reduced City jail 
population, primarily composed of people who are considered “violent” or 
“chronic.”81  The roadmap also continues to invest in the carceral system by 
proposing the allocation of $100 million to training new corrections 
officers.82 
While the City’s plan highlights specific steps aimed at altering the current 
methods of criminal “justice” in New York City, the reforms focus primarily 
on speeding up the process and improving the experience of the system, 
rather than on addressing the issues that cause people to come into contact 
with the system in the first place.  Notably, funds are directed toward 
constructing newer and more modern decentralized jails and training 
corrections staff.83  The extent to which funds might support improvements 
in access to education, health, mental health, and substance abuse treatment 
outside of the carceral system is largely unaddressed.  Relatedly, the 
roadmap proposes very limited interventions for other key actors in the 
system: district attorneys are tasked with improving case processing times,84 
refining risk assessments,85 and expanding the use of supervised release and 
diversion.86  Prosecutors and police officers are not urged to explore how 




mplex-is-unrealistic.html [https://perma.cc/C8PF-SGB5]. See generally SMALLER SAFER 
FAIRER, supra note 75. 
 78. See generally SMALLER SAFER FAIRER, supra note 75. 
 79. See id. at 8. 
 80. See id. 
 81. See id. at 11–18. 
 82. See id. at 36. 
 83. See id. at 9, 36. 
 84. See id. at 26–27. 
 85. See id. at 19. 
 86. See id. at 21. 
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The strategies proposed by the Mayor’s office address the low-hanging 
fruit of decarceration but fail to take on more challenging issues such as 
re-thinking our approach to detaining so-called violent offenders in pretrial 
detention.87  By investing billions in new borough-based jails to incarcerate 
“violent” and “chronic” people, many of the most intractable problems of the 
criminal punishment system remain unaddressed.  The construction of four 
local jail facilities is likely to carry Rikers Island’s same culture of violence 
and deprivation to new locations.  Additionally, given that implementation 
of these strategies would extend beyond the term of Bill de Blasio and the 
current City Council, many rightly question whether a plan that relies on the 
support of future elected officials, continued decline in crime rates, and 
constantly evolving dynamics will ever actually come to fruition.88  The 
reverberations of the social and fiscal crisis brought on by COVID-19 only 
serve to deepen these concerns. 
iii. New York State Criminal Legislative Reforms 
In 2019, New York State passed a historic set of criminal legislative 
reforms that would significantly impact New York City’s criminal legal 
process and decarceral efforts.89  The legislation focused on bail reform, 
speedy trial, and discovery — areas that most impact the length of detention 
and the duration of a criminal case. 
Of all the changes to the statutory scheme, the reform of the cash bail 
system presents the most immediate impact on reducing the population of 
pretrial detainees.  In New York State, judges historically had a set of factors 
to consider when determining whether and how much money bail was 
required to ensure an accused person’s appearance for subsequent court 
dates.90  Considering a person’s dangerousness to the community, or 
so-called preventative detention, has never been an explicit factor permitted 
by statute.  Nonetheless, judges frequently exercised their discretion to set 
 
 87. See discussion infra Part III. 
 88. See Matthew Haag, N.Y.C. Votes to Close Rikers. Now Comes the Hard Part, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 17, 2019, 1:45 PM), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/17/nyregion/rikers-island-closing-vote.html 
[https://perma.cc/6G77-T77M]; Rachel Holliday Smith, Manhattan Jail Design Forges 
Ahead Even as Plan to Replace Rikers Is Delayed to 2027, 
CITY (Oct. 19, 2020, 8:02 PM), 
https://www.thecity.nyc/2020/10/19/21524219/manhattan-jail-tombs-replace-rikers-delayed
-nyc [https://perma.cc/L52S-AS2T]. 
 89. The reforms largely relate to speedy trial, discovery, and bail. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. 
LAW §§ 30.30, 245.10, 500.10 (McKinney 2020). 
 90. Prior to 2020, the applicable bail statute provided that, “[w]ith respect to any principal, 
the court must consider the kind and degree of control or restriction that is necessary to secure 
his court attendance when required.” Id. § 510.30(2)(a) (McKinney 2019). 
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high amounts of cash bail in cases where a person’s appearance in court 
could be assured through other means.91  In New York, as in cities across the 
country, pretrial detention is disproportionately experienced by Black and 
Latinx people.92 
The changes to New York’s bail statute did not do away with cash bail 
completely, but instead require pretrial release without money bail for most 
types of misdemeanor and non-violent felony offenses.93  In cases where bail 
would still be set, the law mandated that judges issue an easier-to-pay form 
of bail.94  Notably, the reforms also required a waiting period and notice to 
the accused before the issuance of a bench warrant after a missed court date 
and mandated the issuance of appearance tickets for a number of previously 
arrestable offenses, which would allow a charged person to return to court at 
a later date for arraignment as opposed to being held for 24 hours or more 
before arraignment.95  These changes have tremendous potential to reduce 
the number of people who are detained pre-trial. 
 
 91. See INSHA RAHMAN, VERA INST. OF JUST., AGAINST THE ODDS: AN EXPERIMENT TO 
PROMOTE ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BAIL IN NEW YORK CITY’S CRIMINAL COURTS 4 (2017), 
https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/Against_the_Odds_Bail_report_FINAL3.pdf 
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 92. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM: BAIL AND PRETRIAL DETENTION OF 
LOW INCOME NONFELONY DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK CITY 47 (2010), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1210webwcover_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SNM2-MSKK]. Racial disparities have been found to exist at every stage 
of the criminal legal process where discretionary decisions are made, but they are particularly 
prevalent in bail determinations. Racial bias by prosecutors and judges results in Black and 
Latinx defendants having cash bail set with more frequency and in greater amounts than 
similarly situated white defendants. See Ellen A. Donnelly & John M. MacDonald, The 
Downstream Effects of Bail and Pretrial Detention on Racial Disparities in Incarceration, 
108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 775 (2018); Cynthia E. Jones, “Give Us Free”: 
Addressing Racial Disparities in Bail Determinations, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 919 
(2013). Some jurisdictions have moved to the use of risk assessments to alleviate some of the 
bias inherent in discretionary bail decisions. However, empirical studies show that reforms 
using risk assessments in bail determinations have reduced the pretrial population but have 
little or no impact on eliminating racial disparities. See Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk 
Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L. REV. 303, 304–05 (2018). 
 93. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.10(4); see also INSHA RAHMAN, VERA INST. OF J., 
NEW YORK, NEW YORK: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 2019 BAIL REFORM LAW 9 (2019), 
https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/new-york-new-york-2019-bail-reform-law-hi
ghlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ANW-S9JS]. 
 94. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.10; see also Michael Rempel & Krystal Rodriguez, 
Bail Reform in New York: Legislative Provisions and Implications for New York City, CTR. 
FOR CT. INNOVATION 4 (Apr. 2019), 
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/media/document/2019/Bail_Reform_NY
_full_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/94HJ-MNMA]. The court must consider the accused’s ability to 
pay bail and post a secured, partially secured, or unsecured bond. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 
§ 510.30(1)(f). 
 95. See Rempel & Rodriguez, supra note 94, at 7; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 
150.20(1)(a) (mandating desk appearance tickets for certain offenses); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 
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In terms of discovery, New York’s previous law allowed prosecutors to 
withhold witness names and police reports until right before the start of 
trial.96  This practice kept vital information needed to prepare a defense from 
the accused until just before the start of trial and often had the effect of 
encouraging people to plead guilty earlier in the life of the case without full 
knowledge of the weight of the prosecution’s case.97  The change in law 
recognizes that the vast majority of cases are resolved by plea rather than 
trial.  Under the new law, prosecutors would have 20 days from arraignment 
to provide the defense with evidence such as witness names, police 
documents, and photos.98  They would be permitted an extension under 
exceptional circumstances and also be entitled to reciprocal discovery from 
defense counsel after their disclosures.99  Many local prosecutors and law 
enforcement groups argued that earlier disclosure to the accused would 
encourage witness intimidation, particularly when allegations of sexual 
assault or gang activity were involved.100  The reforms also addressed the 
“speedy trial clock,” which governs the amount of time after arraignment 
 
§ 510.50(2) (providing a grace period for return after a missed court date before a warrant is 
issued); Martha Rayner & Alex Garber, How an Unheralded Change to Criminal Procedure 
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 96. See Donna Lieberman & Isabelle Kirshner, Take off the Blindfold: Reform NY 
Discovery Law, N.Y.C.L. UNION (Mar. 11, 2019), 
https://www.nyclu.org/en/publications/take-blindfold-reform-ny-discovery-law-commentary 
[https://perma.cc/DT39-7SSC]; see also Beth Schwartzapfel, Defendants Kept in the Dark 
About Evidence, Until It’s Too Late, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2017), 
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 97. See Lieberman & Kirshner, supra note 96; see also Dan Svirsky, The Cost of Strict 
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 98. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 245.10, 245.20. 
 99. See id. § 245.10(1)(iv)(B) (permitting extensions); id. § 245.20(4) (discussing 
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that the prosecution has to bring the case to trial.  Historically, this time 
period has been measured in ways that allow for long case delays.101  The 
new laws limit the prosecution’s ability to cause unnecessary delay.102  These 
changes in discovery and speedy trial practices promise more fairness to the 
accused through earlier access to information and an expedited adjudication 
process, which by extension contribute to shorter stays in pre-trial detention. 
Prosecutors and law enforcement groups across the state met the 2019 
legislative reforms with significant resistance.103  Among their grievances 
with the new laws were concerns about the safety of witnesses whose 
information would be turned over to the defense at an earlier stage, and the 
excessive amount of work required of district attorneys in complying with 
discovery obligations.104  Early on, reporting uncovered that district 
attorneys’ offices were training junior prosecutors on how to work with the 
police to undermine the spirit of the new law.105 
Following the passage of the NYC plan to close Rikers Island, but before 
the COVID-19 outbreak, top NYPD officials were already on a media 
campaign to stoke fears about the State and City’s move toward 
decarceration.  In October of 2019, former NYPD Commissioner James 
O’Neill warned that reforms intended to change the City’s bail system could 
endanger the safety of New Yorkers: 
Come January 1, there are going to be very few people that are bail eligible, 
so you’re going to see people that have significant criminal histories, 
significant firearms histories, and they’re not going to be held in . . . .  
 
 101. See Daniel Hamburg, A Broken Clock: Fixing New York’s Speedy Trial Statute, 48 
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That’s going to put people at risk, put New Yorkers at risk, put victims at 
risk, and put witnesses at risk.106 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, statements such as these make clear that the 
legislative measures aimed at shrinking the City’s reliance on pretrial 
detention have not been embraced by the City’s law enforcement arms, 
which remain wedded to more traditional, pro-carceral approaches. 
II. HOW THE CRIMINAL LEGAL SYSTEM RESPONDED TO COVID-19 IN 
NEW YORK CITY 
Given the context of the City’s steps toward decarceration, the COVID-19 
pandemic introduced a new degree of urgency to the entire system.  In order 
to adequately respond to the COVID-19 public health crisis, all parts of the 
criminal legal system had to alter their usual course of operations drastically.  
Decarceration requires reducing the stream of people into jails and hastening 
the movement of people out of jails by “reducing arrests and increasing early 
release.”107  To ensure an aggressive public health response, the system, 
through each of its parts, had to eliminate unnecessary face-to-face contact 
and reduce the number of people entering and held in City jails.  This Part 
will detail the efforts of institutional actors in achieving these two goals. 
A. Eliminating Unnecessary In-Person Contact Through Policing 
Enforcement of social distancing rules did little to minimize in-person 
contact through policing during the height of the COVID-19 outbreak in 
New York City.  In March, as COVID-19 emerged as a public health crisis 
in the City, the NYPD refused to heed calls from advocates and local elected 
officials asking for the suspension of enforcement of low-level “broken 
windows” policing until the end of the pandemic.108  Despite the risks to the 
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members of the NYPD and to residents of New York City, NYPD Police 
Commissioner Dermot Shea publicly responded that he “ha[d] no intention 
of strategically cutting enforcement specifically related to th[e] 
coronavirus.”109  Despite Shea’s statement, the circumstances of the 
pandemic resulted in a decrease in arrests — by “March, the New York City 
Police Department made about 13,000 arrests, a 30-percent drop from the 
same month a year before.”110  Although arrest numbers decreased overall, 
concerns about how police officers exercised their discretion persist. 
As the NYPD attempted to shift to a public health enforcement role, news 
reports supported by data and video footage raised concerns about the 
aggressive and disparate way that the NYPD engaged with New Yorkers 
while enforcing government social distancing orders.  In May, reports of 
violent arrests resulting in people being assaulted while being ticketed or 
arrested surfaced.111  The aggressive enforcement of social distancing 
violations in predominately Black and Latinx neighborhoods was juxtaposed 
to images of police officers handing out masks to mostly white visitors in the 
City’s neighborhood parks.112  Numbers released by the Brooklyn District 
Attorney’s Office showed that from March 17 through May 4, the NYPD 
arrested 40 people for social distancing-related violations.113  “Of those 
arrested, 35 people were black, four were Hispanic and one was white.  More 
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 110. Weihua Li, Police Arrested Fewer People During Coronavirus Shutdowns — Even 
Fewer Were White, MARSHALL PROJECT (June 6, 2020, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/06/02/police-arrested-fewer-people-during-corona
virus-shutdowns-even-fewer-were-white [https://perma.cc/T6TK-PGLX]. A search of NYC 
OpenData indicates 19,672 arrests in March of 2019. See NYPD Arrests Data (Historic), NYC 
OPENDATA, 
https://data.cityofnewyork.us/Public-Safety/NYPD-Arrests-Data-Historic-/8h9b-rp9u 
[https://perma.cc/EHY8-G2AD] (last visited Oct. 14, 2020) (follow “create visualization” 
hyperlink; then “filters” hyperlink; then “add filter” hyperlink; then “ARREST_DATE” 
hyperlink; set range “03/01/2019 to 03/31/2019”; then “Apply” hyperlink). 
 111. See Josiah Bates, ‘We Cannot Police Our Way out of a Pandemic.’ Experts, Police 
Union Say NYPD Should Not Be Enforcing Social Distance Rules Amid COVID-19, TIME 
(May 7, 2020, 5:03 PM), 
https://time.com/5832403/nypd-pandemic-police-social-distancing-arrests/ 
[https://perma.cc/8VWH-QLTT]. 
 112. See Ashley Southall, Scrutiny of Social-Distance Policing as 35 of 40 Arrested Are 
Black, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2020, 3:48 PM), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/07/nyregion/nypd-social-distancing-race-coronavirus.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/3A5E-S67F]. 
 113. See id. 
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than a third of the arrests were made in the predominantly black 
neighborhood of Brownsville.  No arrests were made in the more white 
Brooklyn neighborhood of Park Slope.”114  Even the NYPD’s own figures 
showed that citywide, from March 16 through May 10, 93% of 
COVID-19-related arrests were of Black and Latinx New Yorkers.115  The 
data sparked comparisons to the City’s long, troubled history of racist police 
stops in the practice of stop-and-frisk policing.116 
In late May 2020, anger over systemic racism in the criminal legal system 
and the police killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis prompted protests and 
civil unrest in the streets of New York City and in cities across the country.  
In New York City streets, interactions with law enforcement depicted on 
video showed officers using violent displays of force and aggressive 
tactics.117  Video captured a young protestor violently hurled to the ground, 
someone in a quick-moving NYPD vehicle opening a car door to hit a 
protestor, and demonstrators being corralled and charged with batons and 
pepper spray.118  Since the protests erupted in New York City, over 200 
incidents of police misconduct have been reported to the City’s Civilian 
Complaint Review Board.119 
All told, more than 2,000 people were arrested during the summer 
protests, while the COVID-19 pandemic continued.  Many of the people 
arrested reported waiting for long hours in cramped holding cells.120  Both 
before and during the protests, videos that went viral on social media also 
showed officers not maintaining social distancing regulations or incorrectly 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Kevin Duggan, NYPD Stats Find That 93% of COVID-19-Related Arrests Are 
Made Up of People of Color, AMNEWYORK (May 12, 2020), 
https://www.amny.com/police-fire/nypd-stats-find-that-93-of-covid-19-related-arrests-are-m
ade-up-of-people-of-color [https://perma.cc/273X-7K49]. 
 116. See Southall, supra note 112. These numbers parallel the racial disparities in NYPD 
policing practices generally, where Black and Latinx people are disproportionately stopped 
and frisked, arrested for marijuana offenses, targeted for buy-and-bust operations, or given 
summonses for non-criminal conduct. These persistent disparities suggest that racist policing 
practices are so deeply entrenched in NYPD’s culture that even a public health crisis caused 
by a novel viral pathogen cannot disrupt them. 
 117. See Ali Watkins, They Were Arrested During the Protests. Here’s What Happened 
Next, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/07/nyregion/ny-protest-arrests.html 
[https://perma.cc/4GEN-MUKW]. 
 118. See Ethan Geringer-Sameth, A Month After Historic Curfew, Many Unanswered 
Questions About How City Policed Protests, Looting, GOTHAM GAZETTE (July 8, 2020), 
https://www.gothamgazette.com/city/9575-new-york-city-curfew-unanswered-questions-ny
pd-de-blasio-protests-looting [https://perma.cc/6NR3-DKP4]. 
 119. See id. 
 120. See Watkins, supra note 117. 
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using masks and other personal protective equipment while interacting with 
New York residents.121 
As such, the NYPD’s aggressive social distancing enforcement and 
policing of protestors did little to diminish face to face contact and exposure 
related to the COVID-19 outbreak. 
B. Reducing the Population in City Jails 
As the COVID-19 outbreak spread throughout New York City, many 
advocates and public health experts expressed grave concerns about how 
conditions in City jails would hasten the spread of the virus and have a deadly 
impact on detainees, employees, and their families.122  When the outbreak 
began in March, there were approximately 5,300 people in City jails, over 
900 of them over the age of 50.123  As fears about the virus developed, people 
who worked and were held within City facilities reported a lack of basic 
interventions to aid in preventing the spread of COVID-19.124  There was 
limited access to soap, hand sanitizer, cleaning supplies, masks, or other 
personal protective equipment; people were housed together in small, shared 
spaces that lack adequate ventilation.125  As one detained person described, 
“[i]n my dorm we’d started sleeping head-to-toe.  Imagine a big open room 
with 60 single beds less than 2 feet apart.  There were only 51 or 52 men in 
 
 121. See Bates, supra note 111; see also Melissa Gira Grant, The Pandemic Surveillance 
State, NEW REPUBLIC (May 8, 2020), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/157639/pandemic-surveillance-state 
[https://perma.cc/6Y9F-YBQZ]. 
 122. See Lippman & Nims, supra note 20. 
 123. See New York City Must Act Now on COVID-19 at Rikers Island, VERA INST. JUST. 
(Mar. 25, 2020), 
https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/coronavirus-guidance-rikers-island.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LM7T-7E5W]; see also NYC Officials Call for Release of ‘Most at Risk’ on 
Rikers Island as More Test Positive for Virus, NBC N.Y. (Mar. 18, 2020, 6:22 PM), 
https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/nyc-officials-call-for-release-of-most-at-risk-on-ri
kers-prison-as-more-test-positive-for-virus/2333348/ [https://perma.cc/EJA2-7QML]. 
 124. See Reuven Blau & Rosa Goldensohn, Little Relief for Jails’ Most Vulnerable as 
Pandemic Grows, CITY (Mar. 19, 2020, 8:59 PM), 
https://www.thecity.nyc/coronavirus/2020/3/19/21210419/little-relief-for-jails-most-vulnera
ble-as-pandemic-grows [https://perma.cc/78H9-QDJP]; Christina Carrega, Shampoo, Watery 
Soap to Disinfect: Conditions on Rikers Island During COVID-19 Unsafe, Some Inmates Say, 
ABC NEWS (Mar. 29, 2020, 2:51 PM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/Health/shampoo-watery-soap-disinfect-conditions-rikers-island-cov
id/story?id=69767859 [https://perma.cc/7LLT-L25Q]. 
 125. See Courtney Gross, NYC Correction Investigator Dies of Coronavirus, SPECTRUM 
NEWS (Mar. 16, 2020, 2:00 PM), 
https://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/coronavirus-blog/2020/03/16/nyc-correction-employ
ee-dies-of-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/X8X6-5LXG]. 
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the dorm on any given day, but everyone is still close together.”126  Public 
defenders in New York City issued a joint statement raising these concerns 
and calling for courts, corrections, and elected officials to take drastic 
measures to reduce the population of people held in detention.127 
Over three days in mid-March, a civilian corrections investigator passed 
away from the virus, and both a security corrections officer and a detained 
person in Rikers Island tested positive.128  These cases sparked public 
responses to concerns that the virus had begun spreading within City jails.129  
Medical professionals working within City jail facilities recognized that 
sounding alarms behind the scenes was no longer sufficient to address the 
urgent moral crisis unfolding and took the rare step of speaking publicly 
about their observations.130  In a rare public statement, Ross MacDonald, the 
Chief Medical Officer for Health Services at Rikers, expressed his grave 
concerns through a public thread on social media.  He wrote: 
A message from the Chief Physician of Rikers Island for the judges and 
prosecutors of New York: We who care for those you detain noticed how 
swiftly you closed your courts in response to #COVID19 . . . .  This was 
fundamentally an act of social distancing, a sound strategy in public health.  
But the luxury that allows you to protect yourselves, carries with it an 
obligation to those you detain. . . .  You must not leave them in harm’s 
way.131 
 
 126. Donald Kagan, I Was at Rikers While Coronavirus Spread. Getting out Was Just as 
Surreal, MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 8, 2020, 4:00 PM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/04/08/i-was-at-rikers-while-coronavirus-spread-ge
tting-out-was-just-as-surreal [https://perma.cc/442A-EHCE] (Donald Kagan’s words as told 
to Nicole Lewis). 
 127. See Press Release, Legal Aid Soc’y et al., Joint Defender Statement Calling for 
Immediate Release of Vulnerable Incarcerated New Yorkers in Response to Coronavirus 




 128. See Gross, supra note 125; see also Jennifer Gonnerman, A Rikers Island Doctor 
Speaks Out to Save Her Elderly Patients from the Coronavirus, NEW YORKER (Mar. 20, 2020), 
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 129. See Josiah Bates, ‘We Feel Like All of Us Are Gonna Get Corona.’ Anticipating 
COVID-19 Outbreaks, Rikers Island Offers Warning for U.S. Jails, Prisons, TIME (Mar. 24, 
2020, 1:53 PM), https://time.com/5808020/rikers-island-coronavirus/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZVD9-CBQS]. 
 130. See Gonnerman, supra note 128. 
 131. Ross MacDonald (@RossMacDonaldMD), TWITTER (Mar. 18, 2020, 9:51 PM), 
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[https://perma.cc/C6J7-3SMZ]. 
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Medical professionals also made it clear that a large-scale move to 
depopulate City jails was necessary for a meaningful impact on the people 
released and the detainees and employees who would remain.132 
As an initial response to the need to depopulate City jails, Mayor de Blasio 
announced that the NYPD and the Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice 
(MOCJ) had identified a mere 40 people for release, pending the local district 
attorneys’ offices’ and the courts’ agreement.133  According to the Mayor, 
this initial release was based on pre-existing health conditions or the minor 
nature of the charges of the people being held.134  The Board of Correction, 
New York City’s independent correctional oversight board, echoed the 
appeals of health professionals and advocates and called on the leaders of 
courts, corrections departments, and district attorneys’ offices in the City to 
consider jail depopulation more comprehensively.135  Specifically, the 
agency requested “the release of people over 50 years old, those with 
underlying health conditions, those detained for administrative reasons such 
as technical violations of parole, and those serving short sentences.”136  
These categories of individuals would account for a roughly one-third 
reduction of the City’s jail population.137 
MOCJ official data indicate that as a result of working in conjunction with 
judges, district attorneys, defense attorneys, and corrections departments on 
the city and state levels, City jails saw a significant reduction in the number 
of people entering and released from custody.138  Between March and May 
2020, the number of people entering jails numbered close to 2,000 people, 
compared to more than 7,300 over the same time period in 2019.139  During 
 
 132. See Gonnerman, supra note 128. 
 133. See Blau & Goldensohn, supra note 124. 
 134. See Julia Marsh & Ben Feuerherd, NYC to Begin Releasing Inmates Amid 
Coronavirus Outbreak, N.Y. POST (Mar. 18, 2020, 7:04 PM), 
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 139. See MOCJ FACTSHEET May 25, 2020, supra note 17, at 1. 
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the same time frame, nearly 3,400 people left custody, resulting in a daily 
population decline of 1,480 people.140 
The process of working to rapidly depopulate New York City jails helped 
to reveal the complex patchwork of systems, actors, and laws involved in 
release decisions.  People held in City jails can be there for a host of reasons, 
each requiring a different set of actions and approval by various parts of the 
system for release.141  There are four main categories of people who are held 
in detention at Rikers Island: (1) people charged, but not yet convicted of a 
crime who are being held pretrial on felony or misdemeanor charges;142 (2) 
people who have been convicted of a misdemeanor or felony offense and are 
serving a jail sentence of less than one year; (3) people who were on parole 
after serving time in state prison for a felony offense and have violated one 
of the many requirements of their parole supervision; and (4) people held for 
other reasons, such as awaiting transfer to state prison to serve a sentence of 
over a year or transfer to another jurisdiction or agency due to active 
warrant.143 
Pretrial detainees are usually held when a judge orders bail or remand, 
which a defense attorney or district attorney can seek to change upon request.  
People who have been sent to City custody as a result of a parole violation 
may be there because of a technical violation144 or because they committed 
a new criminal offense while on parole.  For technical violations, the New 
York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision 
(DOCCS) must lift the parole hold, or the state parole board must conduct a 
hearing process to adjudicate the violation and determine whether to restore 
the person to parole supervision in the community or order them to serve an 
 
 140. See id. 
 141. See id. at 2. 
 142. Under the new bail statutes, certain categories of misdemeanor and felony offenses 
and certain categories of defendants are deemed eligible for bail or remand, which can lead 
to pretrial detention. These include “virtually all violent felony offenses; felony witness 
tampering; felony witness intimidation; Class A felonies (except most Class A drug charges); 
sex offenses; criminal contempt when involving a crime of domestic violence; conspiracy to 
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community supervision, listed as a Persistent Felony Offender, accused of harm to a person 
or property, and who pled guilty or were convicted at trial and are awaiting sentence. For 
more extensive detail of bail-eligible offenses, see generally id. 
 143. See MOCJ FACTSHEET April 2020, supra note 138, at 2. 
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conditions of release, such as drug testing or attending a check-in meeting. Statewide, 
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jails in 2019. See Wendy Sawyer, Alexi Jones & Maddy Troilo, Technical Violations, 
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INITIATIVE (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/03/18/detainers/ 
[https://perma.cc/7RYR-9YF4]. 
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additional period of time on their original prison sentence.  If the parole 
detention stems from a new criminal charge, DOCCS must remove the parole 
warrant keeping the person in city custody, and if bail or remand was set in 
the new case, the judge, with input from the defense attorney and district 
attorney, must order release.  For people held in City jails on a sentence of 
less than one year, New York state law authorizes release when “some 
compelling reason consistent with the public interest” is demonstrated.145  
The Commissioner of the City Department of Correction has authority to 
allow people sentenced to less than a year to serve the remainder of their 
sentence at home.146  Finally, for people who are awaiting transfer to state 
prison or are held on other warrants, a judge or the responsible jurisdiction 
can order release. 
Effectuating the mass release of people from City jails required a high 
level of communication between these various institutional actors.  Lack of 
clarity around who could authorize release, public safety fears, and concerns 
over the adequacy of reentry plans slowed depopulation efforts.147  
Additionally, release for any particular individual required a willingness on 
the part of the appropriate institutional actor to exercise the discretion 
provided for by statutory or regulatory authority.  Public defenders and other 
advocates urged broad exercise of judicial authority for detained people and 
petitioned for clients’ release on both an individual and a collective basis.  
Some instances of release were through individual negotiations with 
assigned district attorneys, and others were through the filing of writs of 
habeas corpus.148  The Legal Aid Society reported the release of “over 130 
people through mass writ filings and many more via individual motions.”149 
 
 145. See MOCJ FACTSHEET April 2020, supra note 138, at 2. 
 146. See id. at 2; see also N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 141, 633, 855 (McKinney 2020). 
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Correction Law § 141 allows the commissioner of correction to remove people from 
jail when there is an outbreak of a contagious disease within the facility or in the 
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New York City Must Act Now on COVID-19 at Rikers Island, supra note 123, at 1–2. 
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 148. See LAS Files Fourth Lawsuit to Free 100 Clients from Parole Violation Holds at 
Rikers Island, LEGAL AID SOC’Y (Apr. 3, 2020) [hereinafter LAS Files Fourth Lawsuit], 
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role-violation-holds-at-rikers-island/ [https://perma.cc/ZL63-SJLG]. 
 149. Id. 
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When one actor in the system failed to exercise its authority, advocates 
would often seek relief through another.  In the parole violation context, 
DOCCS was notably slow in acting to release people detained at Rikers on 
violations of parole.150  The Rikers Island office where parole revocation 
hearings are held was closed after an officer tested positive in March, 
significantly limiting the capacity for hearings.151  When DOCCS failed to 
act, public defenders filed mass writs on behalf of clients held on parole 
warrants arguing that continuing to hold vulnerable people on parole 
warrants “constitutes deliberate indifference to the risk of serious medical 
harm in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the New York State 
constitutional right to due process.”152 
One issue of persistent concern between different actors in the system was 
whether individuals at high risk for complications from the virus who were 
charged with violent offenses should be released.153  The Mayor and the 
DOC stated that they would prioritize for release “those over 50 years of age, 
and those with the underlying health conditions that put people at highest 
risk from COVID-19, including auto-immune, heart and lung diseases, 
diabetes, and cancer.”154  Mayor de Blasio went on record to say that “[t]here 
 
 150. One tragic case detailed in the news is that of Raymond Rivera, who was detained on 
a parole violation in August 2019, and languished in Rikers Island for over six weeks after an 
administrative judge ordered his release. See Jan Ransom, Jailed on a Minor Parole Violation, 
He Caught the Virus and Died, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2020, 4:15 PM), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/09/nyregion/rikers-coronavirus-deaths-parolees.html 
[https://perma.cc/W3DQ-4WCR]. Mr. Rivera became ill with COVID-19 while detained past 
his designated release date and died of the virus on April 4, 2020. See id. Another example is 
the case of Michael Tyson. Mr. Tyson, 53, died of COVID-19 on Sunday, April 5, 2020, in 
New York after being “in custody at Rikers Island for nearly three weeks on a technical parole 
violation. The New York Legal Aid Society and the New York Civil Liberties Union had filed 
a writ requesting his release the week prior to his death.” Malia Brink, Hero Public Defenders 
Respond to COVID-19, 35 CRIM. JUST. 39, 40 (2020). 
 151. See Ransom, supra note 150. 
 152. LAS Files Fourth Lawsuit, supra note 148. 
In New York, as both detained individuals and staff members began to test positive 
in Rikers, the New York Legal Aid Society sprang into action, filing mass writs on 
behalf of those detained for technical parole and probation violations and those 
detained pretrial whose age or medical condition made them particularly vulnerable 
to COVID-19. The initial writ, covering 116 individuals, was filed on March 20, 
2020. It was followed by several subsequent mass writs, as well as numerous 
individual motions filed by Legal Aid and other public defense providers in New 
York. By the end of March, the New York City jail at Rikers Island had thinned 
dramatically from over 5,200 to around 4,300. 
Brink, supra note 150, at 40. 
 153. See supra Section I.B.ii (discussing the need for a more nuanced distinction between 
offenses designated as violent or non-violent). 
 154. See MOCJ FACTSHEET May 25, 2020, supra note 17, at 2. 
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are some who have domestic violence charges or sexual offenses charges 
who I have determined we are not prepared to release at this time.”155 
During the first wave of the pandemic in spring 2020, roughly 3,400 
people were released from New York City jails.156  People left City custody 
for a host of reasons: some paid bail, some completed their sentences, others 
were ordered to be released by the court, and others were released based on 
writs filed by defense counsel.157  During that time frame, the population of 
violent felony offenders saw the smallest decrease.  According to DOC data, 
of those remaining in custody, 67% were charged with violent felonies, 12% 
were charged with non-violent felonies, 4% with misdemeanors, 3% were 
serving city sentences, 10% had another warrant or hold on them, 5% were 
held on state technical parole violations, and 9% were held for other 
reasons.158  As such, the various stakeholders of New York City’s criminal 
legal system made drawn-out but modest progress in decreasing the 
population at Rikers Island. 
III. LESSONS FOR DECARCERATING NEW YORK CITY 
The full impact of COVID-19 on New York City’s larger efforts to close 
Rikers and implement decarceral policies still remains to be seen.  However, 
at this stage, the initial responses from various parts of the system at the 
height of the initial outbreak in the City provide valuable insight into the 
future of the City’s larger decarceral agenda.  This Part offers 
recommendations for furthering a decarceral agenda in the wake of the 
pandemic.  First, the City must adopt a public health-informed agenda.  
Second, it must reckon with the cultural institutional norms that continue to 
impede a commitment to decarceration.  Third, it must confront the hard 
cases involving violence, and fourth, the City must resist the tendency 
toward regression brought about in the economic aftermath of COVID-19. 
A. Decarceration Requires a Public Health Is Public Safety Perspective 
When crisis strikes, the high costs and heavy obligations of maintaining 
the current criminal legal system are laid bare.  The pandemic has revealed 
that the City’s reliance on jail and criminalization has been based more on 
convenience, politics, capitalism, and racism than on necessity or 
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effectiveness.  In normal times, the civil, psychological, or physical harm 
caused to a specific detainee, officer, or discrete group of detainees or 
officers is typically experienced in very individualized ways, such as a 
specific complaint, a death, or a class action lawsuit.  Yet the outbreak of this 
deadly virus has shown, in a very visceral way, what those with loved ones 
ensnared in the criminal legal system have always known: the criminal legal 
process causes and exacerbates harm, not only to the individual person held 
but to all the people around them as well. 
Law enforcement, the judicial process, and City jails interact with each 
other in ways that will impact justice-involved people (whether they have 
been deemed guilty or not), employees who work within these spaces, the 
families of justice-involved people and employees, and the larger public.  
The existence of a deadly virus within the criminal system serves as a very 
palpable marker of this interconnectedness.  The virus has many 
opportunities for transmission from the moment someone is arrested.  A 
person and a police officer are in close contact, where one may transmit the 
virus to the other; an arrested person interacts with other detained people in 
the precinct, during transport between facilities, while in court for an 
appearance, and in jail.  In jail, the virus can be passed between people who 
are exposed to unsanitary, crowded conditions and meager healthcare access.  
Finally, corrections officers and detainees who are released could then bring 
the virus into their homes and communities.159  This interconnectedness also 
impacts the community’s ability to manage the pandemic when at crisis 
levels: “Prisoners with serious symptoms wind up in the local hospitals, 
worsening shortages of doctors, nurses, masks, ICU beds, and ventilators. 
People who have never seen a city jail could die because too many others 
were kept in one.”160  Each part of the criminal legal system is deeply 
interrelated and reliant on the other parts and what happens within this 
process spills over to the larger community. 
The many people who pass through New York City’s precincts, courts, 
and jails experience high rates of chronic illnesses, as well as mental health 
and substance abuse concerns.  The well-documented conditions of 
detention, which include “overcrowding, violence, sexual victimization, use 
of solitary confinement, and lower standards of medical care,” are damaging 
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not only to the physical and mental health of incarcerated individuals but 
also to their families and communities.161  Many of these realities are the 
product of choices about where government and social structures invest 
resources.  The impact is pernicious and intergenerational: 
According to a widely-accepted public health model called the social 
determinants of health (SDH), human health is profoundly influenced by a 
range of social, economic, and political forces beyond the control of the 
individual.  Forty years of mass incarceration has had crippling, 
intergenerational effects on SDH including: Altering the demographic 
composition of communities in ways that fracture family structures and trap 
young children in poverty; Diminishing the educational opportunities of 
youth; Stagnating economic mobility and widening income inequality; 
Exacerbating homelessness; Restricting access to essential social 
benefits . . . .162 
The COVID-19 outbreak illustrates, on a very practical level, this larger 
connection between socio-political choices, health, and safety.  Lasting 
decarceration requires that institutional actors operate from an understanding 
that public health is vital to ensuring public safety. 
Detention perpetuates the violence, trauma, and deprecation of human life 
that is endemic to jails and the criminal legal process writ large.  Those who 
work or are held within jails often experience trauma due to the physical and 
psychological violence they are exposed to.163  What often results from the 
violence of jails is post-traumatic stress, which can manifest as mental health 
and anger management issues.164  The effects directly impact the family 
members and communities of those involved in the criminal legal system. 
This concrete demonstration of how public health interacts with the 
criminal legal process should be applied to a larger understanding of justice 
and safety in the movement toward decarceration.  Despite some actors’ 
professed commitment to decarceration in New York City, many of the 
public responses that came from the local district attorneys’ offices and the 
Mayor’s office during the pandemic demonstrated a commitment to a more 
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traditional and punitive interpretation of public safety.165  The pandemic has 
tested the limits of each institutional actor’s tolerance for enabling 
wide-reaching and immediate systemic harm.  The default response of 
institutional actors in the City — judges, government officials, and district 
attorneys — has been to think of public safety primarily in terms of personal 
victimization: when someone causes harm to the physical or property 
interests of another, it in turn harms broader societal norms.  However, “the 
community interest in safety is often not separate from the defendant’s, but 
entwined with it.”166  Investing in the health, safety, and well-being of the 
criminally accused and most marginalized people in our communities will 
be more responsive to the “complex dynamics” that make up public safety.167 
The institutional parts of the City’s criminal legal system each have a 
responsibility to care for and promote the well-being of people within the 
system whether they are the accused, the detained, someone who has 
experienced harm, or someone who works to maintain the system’s 
functioning.  A public health emergency like this shows that the system has 
been criminalizing and jailing people in ways that cannot responsibly be 
sustained.  A more informed interpretation of public safety, which considers 
the role of public health, would require an equal or perhaps even greater 
focus on caring for people collectively in ways that are proactive and not 
merely reactive.  This would reflect a recognition that centering our 
interconnectedness will help us all to thrive and be kept safer.  Such an 
orientation emphasizes how front-end investments in preventative 
healthcare, education, and employment will protect the personal interests of 
more individuals in the long-term.  Much of what can be learned from 
COVID-19 in terms of decarceration efforts supports what organizers and 
advocates have been pushing for even before the pandemic: resources that 
have been used to maintain criminalization, punishment, and detention 
should be directed toward preventative health and physical and mental 
well-being.  Institutional actors have yet to meaningfully embrace a more 
capacious definition of public safety, one that recognizes the important role 
that public health plays in keeping all individuals safe. 
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B. Deep Entrenchment of Institutional Cultural Norms Impedes 
Decarceral Progress 
The prolonged isolation that many people experienced for the first time 
during the pandemic has opened up the potential to shift public and political 
sentiment about our liberal use of confinement in the criminal legal context.  
While the ills of detention, police violence, and structural racism are not new, 
the stillness of a pandemic has made it harder for some people to look away.  
This has led to a heightened awareness of the need to reduce our reliance on 
carceral responses.  Although a mandated public health quarantine in one’s 
home and the perils of pretrial detention are extremely different, a common 
link can be found in the deprivation of social contact and the attendant senses 
of despondence, anxiety, and powerlessness that follow.168  Many who 
previously may not have thought very critically about the deep impact of a 
person being deprived of their liberty are now questioning how our criminal 
legal system resorts to criminal detention so casually.169  This awareness has 
also come at a time of great social unrest and organizing around issues of 
police violence and persistent racial inequities in the criminal legal system 
and our larger society.170  Increased public concern about the deep impact of 
structural racism and each person’s individual responsibility for effectuating 
consequential change has never been more urgent.171  Yet, this current social 
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reality sits in tension with the well-entrenched cultural norms of the legal, 
law enforcement, and political institutions in New York City. 
The City’s institutional actors must go beyond surface-level support and 
commit to shifting the cultural norms of their individual offices in order to 
facilitate decarceral progress.172  It is clear from the overall response to 
COVID-19 in the criminal legal system that universal support for 
decarceration does not exist among the City’s institutional actors.  The 
NYPD’s aggressive and racially disparate treatment of New Yorkers during 
the height of the pandemic and racial justice protests demonstrates that 
decarceration does not fit within the organizational and cultural values of the 
NYPD.  Political actors tasked with moving decarceration ahead have missed 
key opportunities to counteract the actions of the NYPD and to stimulate 
cultural change within their own organizations.  For example, in trying to 
appear responsive to the demands of social justice activists calling for the 
defunding of the NYPD, New York City leaders agreed to cut $1 billion from 
the NYPD’s $6 billion operating budget.173  Yet, as many have observed, 
without changes to the fundamental nature of the carceral arms of New York 
City government — such as policing, prosecution and correction — 
decarceral efforts will continue to fall short.174 
Even the City’s self-styled progressive prosecutors missed opportunities 
to take bold steps to advance organizational change within their offices that 
would support decarceration.  Chief prosecutors are responsible for setting 
“‘the tone and culture of the office’ and . . . determin[ing] the direction in 
which prosecutors working under them exercise their discretion in individual 
cases.”175  Throughout the height of the pandemic, prosecutors’ offices 
across the City continued to move slowly and resisted taking decisive, 
proactive steps to reduce the Rikers jail population.  Brooklyn’s District 
Attorney, Eric Gonzalez, took the most noteworthy steps toward public tone 
setting by releasing a public statement about declining to prosecute 
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“low-level offenses that don’t jeopardize public safety” and publicly 
releasing the numbers of COVID-19 related arrests in the borough.176  While 
those measures were a start, there remains substantial work to be done in 
terms of changing culture, tone, and approach within local prosecutors’ 
offices in supporting decarceration. 
Judges, government officials, and district attorneys are not accustomed to 
thinking differently about punitiveness and social control.  Mass 
incarceration exists in large part because of the punitive sensibilities of these 
actors, and without directly confronting our reliance on punitiveness, 
decarceration cannot be achieved.177  Decarceration requires that these actors 
use their positions to support health-oriented interventions at the front end of 
the system and make sure that a restorative perspective is reflected in their 
discretionary decisions at the back end of the criminal legal process.  
Persistent community pressure, true institutional buy-in, and organizational 
culture reform will help to move decarceration forward.178  A mobilized 
public will continue to have a role in disrupting entrenched political and 
institutional norms.179 
C. Decarceration Requires Changing the Narrative About Violence 
Grappling with how we treat so-called violent offenders is perhaps one of 
the most challenging and important aspects of public safety and 
decarceration considerations.  The City’s pre-COVID-19 plans for 
decarceration raise this challenge and resolve it simply by asserting that jail 
and criminalization will be reserved for violent offenders, while greater 
options and alternatives will exist for others.180  During the height of the 
COVID-19 outbreak, district attorneys and the news media zeroed in on 
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concerns about releasing violent offenders and defaulted to traditional 
narratives about what public safety requires.181 
From the outset, it is worth noting that “violent offender,” as it is used 
within the criminal legal system, carries many different meanings and 
understandings.  First, the term “violent” often has a more specific meaning 
in law that does not always correspond to popular perception, and it is critical 
that the facts of each person’s case be considered on an individualized 
basis.182  Designating certain offenses as violent does not always accurately 
convey the individual person’s level of involvement in, or the underlying 
facts of, the alleged crime.  For example, in New York, possession of a 
loaded firearm is considered a violent offense, but the definition of “loaded” 
requires only that the individual charged was in possession of bullets.183  
Burglary, as another example, is considered a violent crime even when no 
weapon is involved and no assaultive conduct occurs.184  Robbery is also 
considered a violent offense even if no actual use of force is alleged or an 
injury sustained.185  Further, in the pretrial context, those charged with 
offenses termed “violent” are the most likely to be held on high bail that they 
are unable to afford, making them most susceptible to coercive plea deals.186  
For example, of the 39,326 cases charged as violent felonies in New York 
State in 2016, 33% were dismissed entirely while only 22% ended with a 
felony conviction.187 
Finally, even understanding how the term “violent” is often over-inclusive 
and how many cases labeled as violent are dismissed or resolved without a 
felony conviction, the simple truth remains that in a pretrial context, there 
will be people accused of offenses that involve physically aggressive 
conduct.  Does being in jail pretrial for what is deemed a violent offense 
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mean that you must automatically assume a heightened risk of contracting a 
deadly virus?188  Violent offenses raise some of the most challenging 
questions and more deliberate considerations by institutional actors are 
needed.189  During the initial response to the pandemic, the mayor and 
district attorneys publicly hued to a more traditional interpretation of public 
safety by assuring the public that people pegged as violent offenders would 
not be released regardless of their COVID-19-related health risks.190  The 
media and elected officials on both the local and national levels consistently 
play into the belief that the general public does not want to know that 
government is “soft on crime.”191  A true commitment to decarceration 
means that all people involved in making the system function are responsible 
for explaining the nuanced and individualized assessments that go into each 
case.  It requires an evaluation and communication of actual data and 
evidence-based information, so that we do not simply rely on fear and 
speculation. 
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Jails are not capable of providing safety and adequate healthcare for those 
detained there, and the number of people who are categorized as violent is 
often over-inclusive.  There is already important work being done by 
restorative justice advocates in the post-plea, alternative to incarceration 
context to address violence.  While the pretrial detention context, which 
ostensibly carries a presumption of innocence, is quite different, some of the 
core understandings of restorative justice may prove instructive.  It is 
important to emphasize that “[v]iolence is driven by shame, exposure to 
violence, isolation and an inability to meet one’s economic needs — all of 
which are core features of imprisonment.”192  Taking on a more careful 
understanding of what motivates and perpetuates violence, shrinking the 
number of cases that are deemed violent, and finding creative, innovative 
pretrial solutions for offenders that cause harm is imperative to furthering 
meaningful decarceration. 
D. The Economic Impact of COVID-19 Will Present Challenges for 
Lasting Decarceration 
The swift and steady downturn of the economy due to COVID-19, along 
with backlash from the racial justice movement, will potentially create a 
number of factors that can threaten decarceration efforts in New York City.  
One uncomfortable lesson that comes from the response related to 
COVID-19 is that we have to be able to tolerate a certain level of regression 
while we are working toward lasting decarceration.  Many justice-involved 
people struggled financially even when the economy was at its best.  Now, 
with severe budget deficits and record levels of unemployment brought on 
by the economic crisis of COVID-19, marginalization for justice-involved 
people will only deepen.  As Professor Chaz Arnett warns, “[f]inancial 
downturns may act not only to generate economic insecurity, but also to 
increase punitiveness.  This can happen in several ways during times of 
economic instability, from scapegoating particular people or communities, 
to seeking political traction through punitive measures for symbolic 
value.”193 
There is already evidence of this scapegoating and political posturing.  As 
crime rates in New York City have ticked up, the Mayor and Police 
Commissioner have claimed that the pandemic, the protests, and the state 
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reforms to the bail statute are responsible.194  Others within law enforcement 
have placed blame on detainees released because of COVID-19.195  
However, many of these claims have been proven to be unfounded.  The 
NYPD’s own data confirms that “the state’s new bail law and the mass 
release of inmates from city jails in recent months because of the coronavirus 
outbreak played almost no role in the spike in shootings.”196  Of the 1,500 
people released from Rikers during the height of the pandemic in March and 
April, only seven had been rearrested in connection with weapons 
offenses.197 
Many in law enforcement who have not supported decarceration at any 
point will seize on economic and social challenges to fuel deeper 
entrenchment of “get tough” policies and approaches.198  In light of the 
economic fallout from COVID-19 and political efforts to impede decarceral 
progress, bold reentry reforms such as incarceration-related debt relief and 
social safety net programs that are inclusive of people with criminal histories 
are needed.199 
CONCLUSION 
The outbreak of COVID-19 highlights the deep-seated resistance to 
decarceration in the City of New York and the challenges for decarceration 
across the country.  Even in the face of calls from the physicians responsible 
for caring for the population of New York City’s jails to rapidly decarcerate, 
city officials and prosecutors moved slowly and conservatively in reducing 
the jail population.  City officials must embrace valuable lessons from their 
response to the COVID-19 outbreak in order to improve prospects for the 
City’s larger decarceral agenda. 
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